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Overview	  of	  ACES	  M&S	  Studies	  
•  Presenta7on	  on	  fast-­‐7me	  simula7on	  of	  unmi%gated	  factorial	  pairwise	  
encounters	  to	  study	  the	  interoperability	  of	  TCAS	  RA	  and	  DAA:	  1)	  DAA	  
Warning	  alert,	  2)	  Well	  Clear	  Recovery	  (WCR)	  guidance,	  3)	  DAA	  collision	  
avoidance	  (DAA-­‐CA)	  region	  	  
•  Complementary	  to	  a	  mi7gated	  factorial	  study	  of	  encounters	  between	  UAS	  and	  
non-­‐coopera7ve	  intruders	  to:	  
–  Inves7gate	  how	  ver%cal	  rate	  errors	  aﬀect	  DAA	  WCR	  guidance	  eﬀec%veness	  
–  Iden%fy	  appropriate	  ver%cal	  rate	  error	  threshold	  for	  suppressing	  ver7cal	  DAA	  
WCR	  guidance	  
•  Complementary	  to	  a	  study	  of	  NAS-­‐wide	  simula7ons	  to:	  
–  Explore	  the	  trade	  space	  of	  aler%ng	  parameters	  using	  the	  MOPS	  aler7ng	  metrics	  	  
–  Evaluate	  diﬀerent	  aler%ng	  schemes	  to	  provide	  data	  to	  DAA	  manufacturers	  
–  Inves%gate	  the	  eﬀects	  of	  sensor	  uncertainty	  on	  safety	  and	  DAA	  aler7ng	  and	  
guidance	  performance	  
•  These	  three	  mutually	  complementary	  studies	  are	  intended	  to	  help	  reﬁne	  and	  
validate	  the	  MOPS	  aler7ng	  and	  guidance	  requirements	   2	  
Features	  of	  the	  Factorial	  Approach	  
•  Strengths:	  
–  Enables	  analysis	  of	  the	  full	  range	  of	  encounter	  situa%ons,	  including	  
“corner	  cases”	  unlikely	  to	  be	  simulated	  in	  NAS-­‐wide	  studies	  due	  to	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  missions	  ﬂown	  by	  UAS	  and	  the	  ﬂight	  paths	  of	  intruders	  
–  Shorter	  run	  %me	  facilitates	  rapid	  follow-­‐up	  inves7ga7ons	  
•  Caveats:	  
–  Does	  not	  naturally	  reﬂect	  the	  distribu%on	  of	  encounter	  geometries	  
expected	  in	  NAS	  
–  Mul%ple	  intruder	  case	  not	  simulated	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Study	  Objec7ves	  
•  Ensure	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  consistent	  with	  TCAS	  RA	  logic.	  	  There	  are	  
substan7al	  gaps	  in	  the	  current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  that	  cause:	  
–  TCAS	  RA	  to	  occur	  before	  DAA-­‐CA	  
–  TCAS	  RA	  to	  occur	  with	  no	  DAA-­‐CA	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Study	  Objec7ves	  
•  Ensure	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  consistent	  with	  TCAS	  RA	  logic.	  	  There	  are	  
substan7al	  gaps	  in	  the	  current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  that	  cause:	  
–  TCAS	  RA	  to	  occur	  before	  DAA-­‐CA	  
–  TCAS	  RA	  to	  occur	  with	  no	  DAA-­‐CA	  
•  Current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on:	  
•  When	  the	  intruder	  is	  ver7cal	  RA-­‐capable	  and	  its	  VRC	  (ver7cal	  
resolu7on	  advisory	  complement)	  is	  unknown	  to	  the	  ownship,	  and	  the	  
intruder	  is	  within	  the	  DAA-­‐CA	  region:	  
–  Al7tude-­‐based	  ver7cal	  guidance	  is	  removed	  for	  the	  ownship	  
–  Ver7cal	  speed	  guidance	  changes	  of	  more	  than	  500	  [/min	  are	  displayed	  as	  not	  
acceptable	  for	  the	  ownship	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0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  AND ZTHR < ZTHR*)
with τmod
* = 50 sec, DMOD = 1.1 NM, τ v
* = 50 sec, and ZTHR* = 800 ft
Comparison	  1:	  Current	  vs.	  “OR”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7ons	  
•  Ensure	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  consistent	  with	  TCAS	  RA	  logic.	  	  There	  are	  
substan7al	  gaps	  in	  the	  current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  that	  cause:	  
–  TCAS	  RA	  to	  occur	  before	  DAA-­‐CA	  
–  TCAS	  RA	  to	  occur	  with	  no	  DAA-­‐CA	  
•  Current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on:	  
	  
•  Inves7gate	  “OR”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  that	  is	  more	  consistent	  w/TCAS:	  
6	  
 
0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  AND ZTHR < ZTHR*)
with τmod
* = 50 sec, DMOD = 1.1 NM, τ v
* = 50 sec, and ZTHR* = 800 ft
 0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  OR ZTHR < ZTHR*)
Comparison	  2:	  Current	  vs.	  “OR-­‐h”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7ons	  
•  Ensure	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  consistent	  with	  TCAS	  RA	  logic.	  	  There	  are	  
substan7al	  gaps	  in	  the	  current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  that	  cause:	  
–  TCAS	  RA	  to	  occur	  before	  DAA-­‐CA	  
–  TCAS	  RA	  to	  occur	  with	  no	  DAA-­‐CA	  
•  Current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on:	  
	  
•  Inves7gate	  “OR”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  that	  is	  more	  consistent	  w/TCAS:	  
•  Inves7gate	  “OR-­‐h”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  that	  is	  more	  consistent	  w/TCAS	  
and	  DAA	  Warning:	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0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  AND ZTHR < ZTHR*)
with τmod
* = 50 sec, DMOD = 1.1 NM, τ v
* = 50 sec, and ZTHR* = 800 ft
 0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  OR ZTHR < ZTHR*)
 
0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  OR h < h*)
with h* = 800 ft
Experiment	  Setup	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Prior	  ACES	  M&S	  studies	  were	  NAS-­‐wide	  
9	  
4-DOF Trajectory Model 
 Aerodynamic models of aircraft  
 Models replicate pilot behavior 
 User-definable uncertainty characteristics 
NAS-­‐wide	  Simula%on	  
•  Gate-­‐to-­‐gate	  simula%on	  of	  
ATM	  opera%ons	  	  	  
•  Full	  ﬂight	  schedule	  with	  
ﬂight	  plans	  
•  Sector	  and	  center	  models	  
with	  some	  airspace	  
procedures	  
Simula%on	  Agents	  
•  Air	  traﬃc	  controller	  decision	  making	  
•  Traﬃc	  ﬂow	  management	  models	  
•  Individual	  aircraN	  characteris%cs	  
•  UAS	  Detect-­‐and-­‐Avoid	  (DAA)	  System	  
[JADEM]	  	  





Airport	  and	  Surface	  
Traﬃc	  Management	  
Current	  study	  uses	  full	  factorial	  module	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4-DOF Trajectory Model 
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•  Full	  ﬂight	  schedule	  with	  
ﬂight	  plans	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  and	  center	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with	  some	  airspace	  
procedures	  
Simula%on	  Agents	  
•  Air	  traﬃc	  controller	  decision	  making	  
•  Traﬃc	  ﬂow	  management	  models	  
•  Individual	  aircraN	  characteris%cs	  
•  UAS	  Detect-­‐and-­‐Avoid	  (DAA)	  System	  
[JADEM]	  	  





Airport	  and	  Surface	  
Traﬃc	  Management	  
•  Non-­‐accelera7ng	  (i.e.,	  straight-­‐line)	  pairwise	  encounte s	  
•  Simple	  kinema7c	  trajectory	  modeler	  
–  Ground	  speed	  
–  Heading	  
–  Ver7cal	  speed	  
Horizontal	   Ver7cal	  
ownship	  
ownship	  
Factorial	  Encounter	  Simula7on	  Overview	  
•  Unmi%gated	  simula%ons	  of	  pairwise	  encounters	  
•  No	  sensor	  uncertainty	  
•  Omnibands	  is	  the	  guidance	  algorithm	  to	  determine	  WCR	  
•  WCR	  occurs	  when	  bands	  are	  en%rely	  non-­‐green	  
•  TCAS	  II	  version	  7.1	  (actual	  code)	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Factorial	  Encounter	  Parameters	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1.3	  million	  encounters	  simulated	  and	  analyzed	  
Parameter	  Type	   #	  Values	   Values	  
Ownship	  ground	  speed	   4	   50,	  100,	  150,	  200	  kts	  
Ownship	  heading	   1	   0	  deg	  
Ownship	  ver7cal	  speed	   1	   0	  [/min	  (ﬂy	  level	  at	  5000	  [)	  
Intruder	  ground	  speed	   5	   50,	  100,	  150,	  200,	  250	  kts	  
Intruder	  heading	   12	   0,	  30,	  60,	  90,	  …,	  330	  deg	  
Intruder	  ver7cal	  speed	   9	   -­‐2000,	  -­‐1500,	  -­‐1000,	  -­‐500,	  0,	  …,	  2000	  [/min	  
Ownship	  trial	  plan	  
maneuver	  turn	  rate	  
2	   1.5,	  3	  deg/sec	  
Ownship	  trial	  plan	  
climb/descent	  rate	  
5	   (500,	  500),	  (1000,	  1000),	  (2000,	  2000),	  (2000,	  
1000),	  (1000,	  2000)	  [/min	  
Horizontal	  intruder	  
trajectory	  shi[ing	  
9	   0	  nmi:	  (x,y)	  =	  (0,0)	  
0.5	  nmi:	  (x,y)	  =	  (0.5,	  0),	  (-­‐0.5,	  0),	  (0,	  0.5),	  (0,	  -­‐0.5)	  
1.5	  nmi:	  	  (x,y)	  =	  (1.5,	  0),	  (-­‐1.5,	  0),	  (0,	  1.5),	  (0,	  -­‐1.5)	  
Ver7cal	  intruder	  
trajectory	  shi[ing	  
7	   -­‐1000,	  -­‐500,	  -­‐250,	  0,	  250,	  500,	  1000	  [	  




CPA:	  HMD	  =	  0	  at	  7me	  t	  
•  Ownship	  and	  intruder	  trajectories	  
extrapolated	  from	  7me	  t	  where	  
HMD	  =	  0	  occurs	  
•  Extrapola7on	  based	  on	  ownship	  
and	  intruder	  headings	  and	  ground	  
speeds	  





•  Intruder	  trajectory	  shi[ed	  by	  some	  
distance	  to	  achieve	  non-­‐zero	  
separa7on	  at	  CPA	  
•  Shi[ed	  intruder	  trajectory	  has	  
diﬀerent	  star7ng	  lat/lon	   ownship	  
Illustra7on	  of	  Horizontal/Ver7cal	  Shi[	  to	  Zero-­‐Sep	  CPA	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HMD	  =	  0	  nmi	  
•  Grid	  of	  horizontal	  shi[s	  is	  combined	  
with	  each	  ver7cal	  shi[	  
•  Each	  combina7on	  of	  horizontal/ver7cal	  
shi[s	  applied	  to	  each	  combina7on	  of	  
ownship	  and	  intruder	  headings,	  ground	  
speeds,	  and	  ver7cal	  speeds	  
Horizontal	  
ver7cal	  shi[:	  0	  [	  
ver7cal	  shi[:	  -­‐250	  [	  
ver7cal	  shi[:	  -­‐500	  [	  
ver7cal	  shi[:	  -­‐1000	  [	  
ver7cal	  shi[:	  +250	  [	  
ver7cal	  shi[:	  +500	  [	  









•  Surveillance	  range:	  20	  nmi	  radius	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Boundary	   HMD	   ModTau	   DMOD	   h	   ZTHR	   VertTau	   Predicted	  Time	  






35	  sec	   0.75	  
nmi	  
450	  [	   N/A	   N/A	   40	  sec	  
DAA-­‐CA	   N/A	   50	  sec	   1.1	  
nmi	  
N/A	   800	  [	   50	  sec	   N/A	  
aler7ng	  metrics	  HAZ	  
plus	  small	  buﬀer	  
aler7ng	  metrics	  
average	  7me	  of	  alert	  
plus	  10	  sec	  
Omnibands	  Parameters	  
•  Look-­‐ahead	  7me:	  120	  seconds	  
•  Hysteresis:	  5	  sec	  
•  Ver7cal	  guidance	  
–  2000	  [	  above	  and	  below	  in	  500-­‐[	  increments	  
•  Al7tude	  inhibi7on	  region	  
–  Deﬁned	  same	  as	  current	  MOPS	  DAA-­‐CA	  region	  
•  Horizontal	  guidance	  
–  All	  the	  way	  around	  the	  ownship	  in	  1-­‐deg	  increments	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Band	  Color	   HMD	   ModTau	   DMOD	   ZTHR	   VertTau	   Predicted	  Time	  
to	  Separa%on	  
Loss	  
Red	   0.75	  nmi	   35	  sec	   0.75	  nmi	   450	  [	   N/A	   40	  sec	  
Yellow	   0.75	  nmi	   35	  sec	   0.75	  nmi	   450	  [	   N/A	   50	  sec	  
Current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  
	  
vs.	  “OR”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	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 0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  AND ZTHR < ZTHR*)
 0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  OR ZTHR < ZTHR*)
Comparison	  1:	  
DAA-­‐CA/TCAS	  RA	  interoperability	  improvements	  
We	  can	  address	  TCAS	  RA	  interoperability	  gaps	  in	  the	  current	  DAA-­‐
CA	  deﬁni7on	  by	  changing	  to	  the	  “OR”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on:	  
 0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  OR ZTHR < ZTHR*)
TCAS	  RA	   DAA-­‐CA	  
Using	  “OR”	  DAA-­‐CA	  
deﬁni7on	  has	  no	  
undesirable	  cases	  
where	  TCAS	  RA	  occurs	  
before	  DAA-­‐CA	  	  
Using	  “OR”	  DAA-­‐CA	  
deﬁni7on	  has	  no	  
undesirable	  cases	  
where	  TCAS	  RA	  
occurs	  and	  there	  is	  
never	  DAA-­‐CA	  	  
TCAS	  RA	  











%	  enc	  with	  TCAS	  RA	  %	  enc	  with	  TCAS	  RA	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Problema7c	  Encounters	  Handled	  by	  “OR”	  deﬁni7on	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vertTau	  greater	  than	  50	  sec:	  Ver7cal	  separa7on	  of	  ~400-­‐600	  [	  
(suﬃcient	  to	  trigger	  TCAS	  RA)	  and	  slow	  ver7cal	  convergence	  rate	  
(500	  [/min)	  
TCAS	  RA	   DAA-­‐CA	  
Undeﬁned	  vertTau:	  Both	  ownship	  and	  intruder	  are	  ﬂying	  level	  and	  
oﬀset	  ver7cally	  by	  less	  than	  600	  [,	  which	  is	  suﬃcient	  to	  trigger	  
TCAS	  RA	  
TCAS	  RA	  
“OR”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  increases	  DAA-­‐CA/TCAS	  
interoperability	  …	  
21	  






TCAS	  RA	  before	  DAA-­‐CA*	   6.2%	   0%	   Eliminated	  
TCAS	  RA	  without	  DAA-­‐CA*	   16.5%	   0%	   Eliminated	  
DAA-­‐CA	  without	  TCAS	  RA**	   65.5%	   69.1%	   Small	  increase	  
DAA-­‐CA	  before	  Warning**	   0.1%	   23.8%	   Large	  increase	  
DAA-­‐CA	  without	  Warning**	   31.4%	   36.4%	   Small	  increase	  






DAA-­‐CA	  before	  TCAS	  RA**	   32.0%	   30.8%	   Small	  decrease	  
DAA	  Warning	  before	  DAA-­‐CA***	   78.9%	   63.2%	   Large	  decrease	  
*:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  TCAS	  RA	  
**:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  DAA-­‐CA	  
***:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  DAA	  Warning	  
	  
…	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  lower	  DAA-­‐CA/Warning	  interoperability	  
22	  






TCAS	  RA	  before	  DAA-­‐CA*	   6.2%	   0%	   Eliminated	  
TCAS	  RA	  without	  DAA-­‐CA*	   16.5%	   0%	   Eliminated	  
DAA-­‐CA	  without	  TCAS	  RA**	   65.5%	   69.1%	   Small	  increase	  
DAA-­‐CA	  before	  Warning**	   0.1%	   23.8%	   Large	  increase	  
DAA-­‐CA	  without	  Warning**	   31.4%	   36.4%	   Small	  increase	  






DAA-­‐CA	  before	  TCAS	  RA**	   32.0%	   30.8%	   Small	  decrease	  
DAA	  Warning	  before	  DAA-­‐CA***	   78.9%	   63.2%	   Large	  decrease	  
*:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  TCAS	  RA	  
**:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  DAA-­‐CA	  
***:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  DAA	  Warning	  
	  “OR”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  addresses	  TCAS	  RA	  interoperability	  gaps	  in	  the	  
current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  crea7ng/expanding	  DAA	  Warning	  
interoperability	  gaps	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 0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  OR h < h*)
	  
Current	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  
	  
vs.	  “OR-­‐h”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  	  	  
 0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  AND ZTHR < ZTHR*)
Comparison	  2:	  
“OR-­‐h”	  deﬁni7on	  has	  large	  decreases	  in	  undesirable	  
situa7ons	  and	  large	  increases	  in	  desirable	  situa7ons	  …	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TCAS	  RA	  before	  DAA-­‐CA*	   6.2%	   0%	   Eliminated	  
TCAS	  RA	  without	  DAA-­‐CA*	   16.5%	   0%	   Eliminated	  
DAA-­‐CA	  without	  TCAS	  RA**	   65.5%	   71.2%	   Small	  increase	  
DAA-­‐CA	  before	  Warning**	   0.1%	   3.2%	   Small	  increase	  
DAA-­‐CA	  without	  Warning**	   31.4%	   39.7%	   Modest	  increase	  






DAA-­‐CA	  before	  TCAS	  RA**	   32.0%	   28.7%	   Small	  decrease	  
DAA	  Warning	  before	  DAA-­‐CA***	   78.9%	   94.7%	   Large	  increase	  
*:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  TCAS	  RA	  
**:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  DAA-­‐CA	  
***:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  DAA	  Warning	  
	  
…	  in	  exchange	  for	  rela7vely	  small	  increases	  in	  undesirable	  
situa7ons	  and	  small	  decreases	  in	  desirable	  situa7ons	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TCAS	  RA	  before	  DAA-­‐CA*	   6.2%	   0%	   Eliminated	  
TCAS	  RA	  without	  DAA-­‐CA*	   16.5%	   0%	   Eliminated	  
DAA-­‐CA	  without	  TCAS	  RA**	   65.5%	   71.2%	   Small	  increase	  
DAA-­‐CA	  before	  Warning**	   0.1%	   3.2%	   Small	  increase	  
DAA-­‐CA	  without	  Warning**	   31.4%	   39.7%	   Modest	  increase	  






DAA-­‐CA	  before	  TCAS	  RA**	   32.0%	   28.7%	   Small	  decrease	  
DAA	  Warning	  before	  DAA-­‐CA***	   78.9%	   94.7%	   Large	  increase	  
*:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  TCAS	  RA	  
**:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  DAA-­‐CA	  
***:	  Denominator	  is	  number	  of	  encounters	  with	  DAA	  Warning	  
	  “OR-­‐h”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  improves	  overall	  interoperability	  between	  




Recommend	  changing	  DAA-­‐CA	  from	  current	  deﬁni7on	  
	  
to	  “OR-­‐h”	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  
	  
	  
due	  to	  signiﬁcant	  posi7ve	  eﬀect	  on	  DAA-­‐CA	  interoperability	  with	  
TCAS	  RA	  and	  DAA	  Warning	  with	  rela7vely	  small	  drawbacks	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 0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  AND ZTHR < ZTHR*)
 
0 ≤ τmod < τmod
*  AND (0 ≤ τ v < τ v
*  OR h < h*)
with h* = 800 ft
Future/Ongoing	  Work	  
Future	  Work	  
•  Inves7gate	  the	  eﬀect	  of	  adding	  HMD	  to	  the	  DAA-­‐CA	  deﬁni7on	  
Ongoing	  work	  
•  Complementary	  mi7gated	  factorial	  study	  for	  encounters	  between	  UAS	  
and	  non-­‐coopera7ve	  intruders	  to:	  
–  Inves7gate	  how	  ver7cal	  rate	  errors	  aﬀect	  DAA	  WCR	  guidance	  eﬀec7veness	  
–  Iden7fy	  appropriate	  ver7cal	  rate	  error	  threshold	  for	  suppressing	  ver7cal	  DAA	  WCR	  
guidance	  
•  Complementary	  NAS-­‐wide	  simula7ons	  to:	  
–  Es7mate	  expected	  frequency	  of	  undesirable	  encounter	  situa7ons	  
–  Explore	  the	  trade	  space	  of	  aler7ng	  parameters	  
–  Evaluate	  diﬀerent	  aler7ng	  schemes	  
–  Inves7gate	  the	  eﬀects	  of	  sensor	  uncertainty	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